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than conjectural. Hence parties to a Florida realty contract cannot
validly provide for liquidated damages when these exceed the actual
damages caused the vendor by the vendee's breach. If, however, the
vendee actually pays to the vendor a sum as part of the purchase
price, the Beatty rule prevents his recovery of any portion thereof if
he defaults. Nevertheless, if he merely deposits earnest money with
an escrow agent, the Medard rule permits him to recover all of it in
excess of the vendor's actual damages. The item of fault, which is
immaterial in two of these types of situations, looms large in the Beatty
type; and the theory of protection against a judicially denominated
penalty is ignored once the contract has been executed in part by
actual payment to the vendor of the sum specified as liquidated
damages.
GEORGE W. WRIGHT, JR.

CONFLICT OF LAWS: USE OF FLORIDA EQUITABLE
REMEDIES TO ENFORCE FOREIGN
ALIMONY DECREE
W obtains a money alimony decree in F-1.1 H flees to F-2 in
order to escape payment. W sues in equity in F-2 for enforcement
of the F-1 decree. What will be the attitude of the F-2 court? Is
it required to accord the decree full faith and credit? 2 If so, must
the F-2 court afford the same relief available in F-1, or is F-2 required
(rev. ed. 1938).

'F-1 is the symbol used to indicate the first forum, and F-2 denotes the
second forum, or the state in which suit is brought on a decree obtained in
another jurisdiction. Thus, if a judgment recovered in New York is sued on
in Florida, New York is F-1 and Florida is F-2. For the sake of brevity, the
letter H refers to husband and W to wife.
2
For the purposes of this note it will be assumed that the F-1 divorce decree
and alimony award is valid and that the decree will be recognized by the F-2
court. The scope of this note is limited to the enforcement of alimony decrees
and divorce decrees with respect to alimony. For a general discussion of extraterritorial recognition, and effectiveness of foreign divorce decrees see Haslup,
Divisible Divorce, 3 U. oF FLA. L. REV. 145 (1950); 4 U. oF FLA. L. REv. 106
(1951). Modification in Florida of Florida decrees, and the related subiect ,F
custody and adoption of children, are discussed in Notes, 1 U. OF FLA. L. REv.
876, 860 (194A).
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merely to allow enforcement by an action at law and execution on
the judgment? If equitable remedies are allowed, will they be applied to both past-due accrued installments and also to future installments as they become due? If the decree is subject to modification
under the laws of F-1, will it be necessary for W to have the past-due
accrued installments reduced to judgment in F-i?
Prior to 1858 doubt had been expressed as to whether an action on
an alimony decree would lie in a jurisdiction other than the one
rendering the decree. 3 In that year the Supreme Court in Barber v.
Barber4 observed by way of dictum that such a decree constitutes
a debt of record entitled to full faith and credit in sister states. This
statement was modified in Lynde v. Lynde5 by the requirement that
the decree be "final" in order to become a debt of record deserving
extraterritorial recognition. In Sistare v. Sistare,6 this limitation on
3

Battey v. Holbrook, 11 Gray 212 (Mass. 1858), was an action in F-2 upon
an F-1 judgment rendered upon a penal bond conditioned for payment to plaintiff as trustee of an annual sum for the support of the wife of defendant. The
court gave judgment for the amount for which execution was awarded in the
original suit. No decree for alimony was involved, as the original judgment was
granted upon an agreement for the support of the wife upon the voluntary
separation of the parties. The court observed: "Upon a decree for alimony, it
may be well to remark by way of caution, we suppose no action will lie in
another jurisdiction." Van Buskirk v. Mulock, 18 N.J.L. 184 (Sup. Ct. 1840),
decided 18 years earlier, held that an action of debt for payment of alimony
would not lie on an equity decree.
421 How. 582 (U.S. 1858). F-1 granted W a divorce a mensa et thoro and
directed H to pay her alimony in quarterly installments. H failed to pay any of
the alimony and fled to F-2. W, by her next friend, sued to recover the overdue alimony on the equity side of the federal district court in F-2. From a
decree for plaintiff the defendant appealed to the Supreme Court of the United
States. The real issue was whether W could set up a domicil separate and apart
from H. The Court held that W was entitled to sue in the federal courts and
that the trial court did not err in giving effect to the F-1 decree. By implication
the opinion indicated that an F-1 alimony decree is a debt of record and as such
is entitled to full faith and credit in F-2.
5181 U.S. 183 (1901). W sued H in F-2 on an F-1 divorce decree awarding
W alimony. The United States Supreme Court held that the court below properly restricted W to the sum already due, inasmuch as the provision for the
payment of alimony in the future was subject to the discretion of the court of
F-i, which might at any time alter it, and was not a final judgment for a
fixed sum.
6218 U.S. 1 (1910). The Court found, however, that the F-1 statutes did
not expressly give the power to revoke or modify the past-due installments. The
opiaion formulated the following rule of construction, at p. 22: ". . . every reasonable implication must be resorted to against the existence of such power in
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the requirements of full faith and credit was further developed, the
Court holding that past-due installments are entitled to full faith and
credit in F-2 unless F-1 can modify or annul the right to receive even
past-due installments. The full-faith-and-credit clause, however, does
not require F-2 to give equitable or statutory remedies that W might
7
obtain in the F-I jurisdiction.
In summarizing the effect of the full-faith-and-credit clause upon
an F-1 alimony decree, we see that it is not necessary that F-2 accord
the decree full faith and credit unless the award is final in the sense
that it constitutes a debt of record. 8 The award is not final when
the F-i court can modify the decree with respect to past-due accrued
installments; 9 in this event W, in order to collect in F-2, must obtain
a judgment in F-i for the amount owing under the decree and then
bring an action at law in F-2 on the judgment. 10
The enforcement of a foreign judgment, at common law, was by
an action of debt. This is still the ordinary remedy by which to enforce a foreign money-judgment. On the theory that a decree for
alimony is a mere money-judgment, F-2 has usually restricted W to
an action of debt."
Since 1927 a series of decisions 12 has indicated that F-2 will often
allow the use of its equity process to enforce a foreign alimony dethe absence of clear language manifesting an intention to confer it."
7
Lynde v. Lynde, 181 U.S. 183, 187 (1901), which is still the leading case
on this point; M'Elmoyle v. Cohen, 13 Pet. 312, 327 (U.S. 1839); see Sistare v.
Sistare, 218 U.S. 1, 26 (1910); see 2 BEALt, CoNFmcT OF LAWS §433.1 (1935):
"The method of enforcement of a foreign judgment is governed by the law of
the forum."
8
Lynde v. Lynde, 181 U.S. 183 (1901).
9
Sistare v. Sistare, 218 U.S. 1 (1910).
10E.g., Lynde v. Lynde, 181 U.S. 183 (1901); Sackler v. Sackler, 47 So.2d
292 (Fla. 1950); Brown v. Brown, 75 A.2d 140 (D.C. Munic. Ct. App. 1950).
11E.g., Worsley v. Worsley, 76 F.2d 815 (D.C. Cir. 1935); Grant v. Grant,
75 F.2d 665 (D.C. Cir. 1935); Weidman v. Weidman, 274 Mass. 118, 174 N.E.
206 (1931); White v. White, 233 Mass. 39, 123 N.E. 389 (1919); Mayer v.
Mayer, 154 Mich. 386, 117 N.W. 890 (1908); Kossower v. Kossower, 142 At.
30 (N.J. Ct. Err. & App. 1928).
32Biewend v. Biewend, 17 Cal.2d 108, 109 P.2d 701 (1941); Creager v. Superior Court, 126 Cal App. 280, 14 P.2d 552 (1932); German v. German, 122
Conn. 155, 188 At. 429 (1936); Rule v. Rule, 313 I. App. 108, 39 N.E.2d 379
(1942); Ostrander v. Ostrander, 190 Minn. 547, 252 N.W. 449 (1934); Fanchier v. Gammill, 148 Miss. 723, 114 So. 813 (1927); Cousineau v. Cousineau,
155 Ore. 184, 63 P.2d 897 (1936); Sorenson v. Spence, 65 S.D. 134, 272 N.W.
179 (1937); McKeel v. McKeel, 185 Va. 108, 37 S.E.2d 746 (1946); Shibley v.
Shibley, 181 Wash. 166, 42 P.2d 446 (1935).
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cree. This trend was inaugurated by Fanchier v. Gammill,13 in
which W sought to establish and enforce a Nevada decree for alimony. The precise question was whether a decree of F-i awarding
alimony can be established and enforced by courts of equity in F-2
or whether it can be enforced by execution only, as on a judgment
at law. The Mississippi court, in holding that such a decree may be
14
established and enforced by the equity courts of Mississippi, stated:
"It is our view that, on account of the character of a judgment
for alimony, which rests, to some extent, upon public policy,
in requiring a husband to support his wife and children, due
to the sacred human relationship, and that they may not become
public charges and derelicts, the decree for alimony, with the
extraordinary power of enforcement by attachment and contempt proceedings, should be established and enforced by our
equity court, which has full and sole jurisdiction of all matters
of divorce and alimony; because to hold that a foreign judgment
for alimony can be enforced in this state only by execution, the
same as judgments at law, would be to impair or to deprive a
foreign judgment for alimony of its inherent power of enforcement by attachment and contempt proceedings."
The Court was of the view that the full-faith-and-credit clause required it to grant this remedy because of the very nature of an alimony
decree.
Later decisions attaining this result, although citing Fanchier v.
Gammill as persuasive, have not based their opinions on the requirement of full faith and credit, but rather on comity and public policy.
In Cousineau v. Cousineau'5 the defendant was ordered to meet
future payments as well as back-sums due under a California decree.
That decree as to future installments was thus made the basis of an
Oregon decree.
The Florida Court faced this problem recently in Sackler v. Sackler.16 The facts fall into the familiar pattern. W obtained a divorce
in New York in 1946, in which proceeding she was awarded the
custody of two minor children and $20 a week for the support of
herself and them. H failed to pay the sums required by the New
13148 Miss. 723, 114 So. 813 (1927).
141d. at 737, 114 So. at 814.
15155 Ore. 184, 63 P.2d 897 (1936).
1647 So.2d 292 (Fla. 1950).
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York decree; and in May of 1948 W obtained a judgment for the
sum of $1,171.75 from the New York court for past-due and unpaid
installments with interest thereon. H having taken up his residence
in Florida, W filed a bill praying that he be required to pay her all
sums of money due under the New York decree and that it be established and enforced by the equity courts of Florida. H denied that
he was financially able to pay the full amount, and alleged that the
provisions of the New York decree respecting support money could
be modified by the New York court from time to time and that accordingly the decree was unenforceable in Florida. The chancellor
decreed that W have a money-judgment for the amount of arrearages
reduced to judgment in New York, but denied all further relief. On
appeal, the Supreme Court held: (1) the lower court erred in denying W equitable remedies, including contempt proceedings for the
enforcement of the New York judgment for arrearages; and (2) the
New York decree, as regards installments to become due under it,
could be established as a local decree and enforced by all appropriate
equitable remedies. The Court left a hiatus in the relief granted,
however, by refusing to enforce the past-due installments not reduced
to judgment in New York.
The court based its holding as to the propriety of equitable remedies
on McDuffie v. McDuffie, 17 and noted that under the law of New
York W was entitled to equitable remedies for the enforcement of
her decree. In the McDuffie case the lower, court had refused to
entertain W's cause in equity, and the question arose whether under
the full-faith-and-credit clause a court of equity in Florida should
entertain jurisdiction of a cause of action based on a Georgia decree.
The Florida Court, in answering this question affirmatively, cited
Fanchierv. Gammil and approved its result without, however, adopting specifically its use of full faith and credit as the basis for decision.
The Court based its holding as to futiire installments on the rule of
comity and the principles of public policy involved in the obligation
of H to support W and their children, although it was not unmindful
of the fact that under the New York Civil Practice Act1 8 the authority
to modify divorce decrees relating to the support of the wife and
children .. . shall extend to unpaid sums or installments accrued
prior to the application as well as to sums or installments to become
due thereafter." It reasoned that, when W comes into equity in
Florida and requests that the decree of a foreign court be established
17155 Fla. 63, 19 So.2d 511 (1944).

18§1170.
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as a local decree, H has ample opportunity to present any equitable
defenses that he may have. It again cited the McDuf-fie case, which
had indicated that the chancellor could make some adjustment in the
amount due under a settlement agreement incorporated in a Georgia
divorce decree if adjustment was warranted by a change in the circumstances of the parties occurring since the time of the settlement
agreement; and it added that our equity courts could entertain a
request by H to modify a foreign decree established here as
a local decree, inasmuch as our statutes 19 authorize them to modify
decrees "of any court of competent jurisdiction" respecting support
for W and the children.
The reasoning leading to the hiatus produced by denying W a
Florida remedy for past-due alimony, though rather obscure, appears
to run as follows: First, the New York decree, until reduced to judgment under the provisions of the New York Civil Practice Act, 20 is
not a final decree entitled to enforcement in Florida under the fullfaith-and-credit clause of the United States Constitution, on authority
of Collins v, Collins.21 Second, the public policy of Florida is contrary to that of New York with respect to modification of past-due
installments; 22 in 1940 Florida adopted the majority view that a
decree requiring payment in installments of alimony or of support
money for the maintenance of minor children vests the absolute right
to each installment when it falls due. 23 As regards a New York decree,
however, the Court took the position in the Sackler case that even
under the principle of comity our courts are not authorized to enter
a decree respecting past-due installments not reduced to judgment
in New York.
FuLL FAiTH AND CREDiT vE.Rsus CoMrTY

24
The Mississippi court based its decision in Fanchier v. Gammil
on the full-faith-and-credit clause of the Federal Constitution; where19

FLA. STAT. §65.15 (1949).

FLA. CONST.

Art. V, §11, assigns to the circuit

court exclusive original jurisdiction in equity.

20§1171(b).
21160 Fla. 732, 36 So.2d 417 (1948)

(Reduction to judgment in New York

of past-due installments under New York decree is prerequisite to legal action in
Florida ).
22

See Selige v. Selige, 138 Fla. 783, 190 So. 251 (1939); Note, 1 U.
L. REV. 376, 384 (1948).
23
Boyer v. Andrews, 143 Fla. 462, 196 So. 825 (1940).
24148 Miss. 723, 114 So. 813 (1927).
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as the Florida Court in Sackler v. Sackler,25 in reaching the same
result, preferred to rest on the rule of comity. Is this distinction
significant? Consider the following hypothetical situation that may
well arise in the future: W obtains an alimony decree in F-1; H flees
to California in order to escape payment and becomes domiciled there;
several years later W comes to Florida for a vacation and discovers
that H is passing through Florida on a business trip; and W thereupon obtains personal service on H and prays for the establishment
and enforcement of her F-i alimony award by the Florida equity
court. This situation, it is submitted, presents a set of facts on which
the doctrine of forum non conveniens can properly be invoked, thereby restricting W to an action at law and execution thereon. The appropriate forum in which to seek equitable remedies would be
California.
If this same set of facts should arise in Mississippi, the Mississippi
court would be bound to grant W equitable relief on the authority
of Fanchier v. Gammill. The Florida Court, however, by basing its
Sackler decision on comity rather than on full faith and credit, has
afforded our chancellors the advantage of flexibility for future ma26
neuvering on individual sets of facts.
2547 So.2d 292 (Fla. 1950).
Although the substantive provisions of the F-i
decree govern the substantive rights of the divorced parties in F-2, the latter
is entitled to use its own judgment as to existence of jurisdiction in F-1 to enter
the decree in the first place, Williams v. North Carolina, 325 U.S. 226 (1945),
as well as its own procedural law in according remedies for enforcing the F-I
decree; see note 7 supra. The practical problems raised by these principles, and
several suggested remedies, appear in Haslup, supra note 2, at 164-174.
2
6Two other hypothetical situations illustrate further the practical nature of
the distinction between the Fanchier and Sackler doctrines:
(1) After obtaining a decree in F-i, W comes to F-2, obtains personal service
on H when he is within the state on business, and persuades F-2 to increase the
future alimony. H returns to F-I and continues to pay at the original rate there
decreed, whereupon W sues him in F-i for the difference already finally accrued pursuant to the F-2 decree. Must F-1 give full faith and credit to the
F-2 increase? There being no jurisdictional question regarding the F-2 decree,
F-i is bound to recognize it, but F-i is not obligated to accord equitable remedies unless, as in Mississippi, it is faced locally with the Fanchier doctrine.
(2) H obtains a divorce in F-i on constructive service, after living there for
years apart from W. The decree awards W alimony in an amount unsatisfactory
to her. H later goes to F-2 on business, where W serves him personally and
obtains a divorce, with higher alimony, F-2 taking the position that the F-i
decree was a nullity for lack of jurisdiction. W then seeks payment of this higher
alimony in F-i, by serving H there. F-i, it is submitted, must accord full faith
and credit to the F-2 decree, there being no question as to the jurisdiction of
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MODIFICATION OF FOBEIGN DECRE

To what extent will Florida modify foreign decrees with respect
to alimony? The following questions are pertinent:
1. Can Florida reduce the amount of installments to be paid in the
the future?
2. Can it reduce the amount of past-due alimony?
3. Can it increase the amount of installments to be paid in the
future?
4. Can it increase the amount of past-due alimony?
It should be observed at the outset that amounts reduced to judgment in the foreign state can always be the subject of an action at
law in Florida on such judgment, pursuant to the mandate of frll
faith and credit. Furthermore, Florida can, and under the Sackler
doctrine often will, grant as a matter of comity equitable remedies
to enforce here the alimony provisions of a foreign decree without
modification, provided it meets the tests of finality and procedural
due process.
Returning to the four questions posed above, the first should be
answered in the affirmative. The Florida court may modify the
foreign decree in the same manner as a local decree, the theory being
that when the foreign decree is established in Florida it becomes the
basis of a local decree and will be enforced as such. Reduction of
future installments will depend on such factors as H's inability to pay
or some other change in the circumstances of the parties. Number
two must be answered in the negative, because under Florida law
each installment becomes absolute and vested when it becomes due.
This position is probably based on the theory that past-due installments under a foreign decree are either final or non-final: if final, the
right to them becomes absolutely vested on the date they fall due;
if non-final, they can be modified by F-1 only, inasmuch as F-2 should
not assume retroactive jurisdiction. This argument, while not the only
one logically possible, is at least a defensible one. The third question
should, it is submitted, be answered affirmatively provided the re-

F-2 to enter it.

But F-1 under the Sackler comity doctrine, need not accord

equitable remedies; it can, and probably will, insist that W be confined to a
series of actions, each based on installments accrued with finality.

The effect

of such a position as regards W could have strong practical influence.
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quirements of jurisdiction and procedural due process are met in increasing the obligation of H.27 Number four must be answered in
the negative because of the Florida attitude toward past-due installments; modification of the alimony provisions of any divorce decree
is in Florida limited to future installments.
CONCLUSION

Since the recognition of an alimony decree as a debt of record, F-2
has been required to recognize it under .the full-faith-and-credit
clause, provided it meets the test of finality, namely whether F-1 can
modify it with respect to past-due accrued installments. If F-1 can
so modify it, it must be reduced to judgment there before it becomes
entitled to extraterritorial recognition.
The old view, though still prevailing in some jurisdictions, restricts
W to reduction to judgment in F-1 of alimony due under its decree,
followed by an action at law in F-2 on the F-1 judgment, thereby
necessitating a new action as each installment accrues. Under the
Mississippi view, W is entitled to have her decree established and
enforced by the equity courts of F-2 for both past-due and future
installments. The underlying philosophy is that the full-faith-andcredit clause requires F-2 to grant equitable remedies for enforcement of the F-1 decree because of the character of an alimony decree.
The Florida variation of the Mississippi view frequently attains the
same result, but it does not bind the Florida courts to grant equitable
remedies for the enforcement of all alimony decrees. The Supreme
Court of Florida has wisely left leeway for future maneuvering. The
forceful language used in the Sackler case indicates, however, that
equitable remedies will normally be granted even though H has sought
only temporary refuge in our state: 28 "... we have no desire to make
this state a haven for fugitive husbands."
GEORGE EARL BROWN

271n Griffin v. Griffin, 327 U.S. 220, 229 (1946), Stone, C.J., stated for the
Court that: ". . . due process requires that no other jurisdiction shall give effect,
even as a matter of comity, to a judgment elsewhere acquired without due
process."
28

Sackler v. Sackler, 47 So.2d 292, 294 (Fla. 1950).
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